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Abstract	  
This	  paper	  provides	  an	  inferentialist	  account	  of	  model-­‐based	  understanding	  by	  combining	  a	  counterfactual	  
account	  of	  explanation	  and	  an	  inferentialist	  account	  of	  representation	  with	  a	  view	  of	  modeling	  as	  extended	  
cognition.	   This	   account	  makes	   it	   understandable	  how	  the	  manipulation	  of	   surrogate	   systems	   like	  models	  
can	   provide	   genuinely	   new	   empirical	   understanding	   about	   the	  world.	   Similarly,	   the	   account	   provides	   an	  
answer	   to	   the	  question	  how	  models,	   that	  always	   incorporate	  assumptions	   that	  are	   literally	  untrue	  of	   the	  
model	   target,	   can	   still	   provide	   factive	   explanations.	   Finally,	   the	   paper	   shows	  how	   the	   contrastive	  






The	   importance	   of	   model-­‐based	   reasoning	   in	   science	   has	   not	   gone	   unnoticed	   by	   philosophers,	   and	   the	  
autonomy	  and	  perceived	  unrealisticness	  of	  most	  models	  have	  raised	  questions	  concerning	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
they	  can	  provide	  understanding	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  puzzlement	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  in	  two	  questions.	  First,	  
how	   can	   the	   manipulation	   of	   these	   surrogate	   systems	   provide	   genuinely	   new	   empirical	   understanding	  
about	  the	  world?	  Second,	  how	  can	  models,	  which	  always	  incorporate	  assumptions	  that	  are	  literally	  untrue	  
of	  the	  model	  target,	  provide	  explanations,	  if	  explanation	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  factive?	  In	  addition,	  a	  viable	  theory	  
of	   model-­‐based	   explanations	   must	   be	   able	   to	   explicate	   what	   makes	   the	   difference	   between	   truly	  
explanatory	   and	   merely	   phenomenological	   models.	   Furthermore,	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   explanatory	  
qualities	   of	   models	   is	   usually	   based	   on	   rather	   unarticulated	   intuitions	   about	   explanatory	   goodness.	   An	  
adequate	  account	  of	  model-­‐based	  explanations	  should	  also	  be	  able	  to	  say	  which	  properties	  of	  models	  are	  
the	  basis	   for	  these	   judgements	  and	  provide	  means	  to	  discuss	  their	  epistemic	   legitimacy.	   In	  this	  paper	  we	  
show	   how	   these	   challenges	   can	   be	   met	   with	   an	   inferential	   conception	   of	   understanding.	   The	   basic	  
elements	  of	  our	  account	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  some	  of	  our	  earlier	  papers	  (Kuorikoski	  2011,	  Kuorikoski	  &	  
Lehtinen	  2009,	  Ylikoski	  2013,	  2014,	  Ylikoski	  &	  Aydinonat	  2014),	  but	  this	  paper	  brings	  these	  ideas	  together	  
and	   expands	   them	   into	   a	   systematic	   account	   of	   model-­‐based	   explanation.	   We	   argue	   that	   approaching	  
model-­‐based	   reasoning	   as	   extended	   cognition	   and	   adopting	   an	   inferentialist	   analysis	   of	   representation	  
dissolves	  both	  of	  the	  two	  central	  questions,	  and	  shows	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  paradox	  associated	  with	  model-­‐
based	   explanations	   arises	   from	   faulty	   philosophical	   assumptions.	   We	   also	   show	   how	   the	   contrastive	  
counterfactual	   theory	  of	  explanation,	  on	  which	  our	   inferential	  conception	  of	  understanding	   is	  based,	  can	  
provide	  tools	  for	  assessing	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  models.	  
Many	  things	  are	  called	  models	  and	  models	  are	  being	  used	  to	  achieve	  many	  things.	  The	  word	  ‘model’	  can	  
refer	  to	  anything	  from	  a	  physical	  scale	  model	  to	  a	  set	  of	  equations	  on	  paper	  and	  a	  program	  running	  on	  a	  
computer.	   Sometimes	   models	   are	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   abstract	   entities	   that	   these	   various	   material	   things	  
somehow	   realize	   or	   instantiate.	   When	   taken	   to	   be	   abstract	   entities,	   some	   believe	   models	   to	   be	  
mathematical	  (set	  theoretic)	  structures	  or	  trajectories	  in	  some	  state	  space,	  whereas	  others	  take	  them	  to	  be	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propositionally	  structured,	  as	  akin	  to	  fiction.	  In	  this	  paper	  we	  approach	  models	  as	  material	  objects	  that	  can	  
be	   used	   to	   keep	   score	   of	   inferential	   moves	   and	   in	   this	   way	   be	   used	   to	   help	   in	   reasoning	   about	   the	  
phenomena	   of	   interest.	   This	   amounts	   to	   approaching	  modeling	   as	   extended	   cognition.	   This	   perspective	  
downplays	  two	  common	  intuitions	  that	  we	  find	  problematic:	  First,	  that	  scientific	  understanding	  should	  be	  
conceptualized	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  individual	  scientists,	  and	  second,	  that	  there	  is	  an	  
epistemic	   puzzle	   concerning	   how	   we	   gain	   empirical	   understanding	   about	   the	   real	   world	   by	   examining	  
abstract	  objects.1	  
Scientific	  models	  also	  have	  many	   functions.	  Data	  models	  serve	   to	   represent	  a	  mass	  of	  data	   in	  an	  orderly	  
and	  economic	  fashion.	  Closely	  related	  phenomenological	  models	  only	  try	  to	  capture	  the	  salient	  observable	  
regularities	   of	   the	   target	   phenomenon.	  Models	   that	   capture	   the	   most	   important	   patterns	   are	   good	   for	  
prediction,	  but	  may	  not	  have	  much	  explanatory	  import.	  	  Scale	  models	  are	  used	  to	  simulate	  the	  behavior	  of	  
the	  target	  system	  in	  conditions	  of	  interest,	  quite	  possibly	  with	  no	  goal	  of	  understanding	  why	  it	  behaves	  as	  it	  
does.	   Many	   models	   are	   only	   for	   illustrative	   and	   pedagogical	   uses.	   In	   this	   paper	   we	   focus	   on	   the	  
understanding	  provided	  by	  abstract	  theoretical	  models	  which	  need	  not	  be	  tested	  against	  or	  estimated	  from	  
any	   specific	   body	  of	   data.	   To	   illustrate	  our	   claims	  we	  use	   the	   family	   of	  models	   commonly	   known	  as	   the	  
Schelling	  segregation	  model.	  Nevertheless,	  our	  basic	  stance	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  explanatory	  import	  of	  more	  
complex	  computational	  models	  and	  models	  fitted	  or	  built	  to	  account	  for	  a	  specific	  empirical	  phenomenon.	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  as	  follows.	  We	  first	  provide	  the	  outline	  of	  our	  conceptions	  of	  explanation	  and	  
understanding	   as	   inferential	   ability.	   In	   the	   following	   sections	   we	   propose	   to	   approach	   modeling	   as	  
extended	  cognition,	  distinguish	  between	  understanding	  the	  model	  and	  understanding	  with	  the	  model,	  and	  
show	  how	  the	  philosophical	  puzzles	  related	  to	  model-­‐based	  explanations	  can	  be	  solved	  by	  supplementing	  
this	   viewpoint	   with	   an	   inferentialist	   account	   of	   representation.	   Finally,	   we	   apply	   our	   theory	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  stance	   in	  the	  ontology	  of	  models	  discussion.	  We	  do	  not	  deny	  that	   it	  makes	  sense	  to	  
abstract	  away	  from	  the	  concrete	  instantiations	  of	  these	  artifacts	  to	  their	  inferential	  properties	  and	  define	  the	  identity	  
in	  these	  terms	  (see	  Kuorikoski	  and	  Lehtinen	  2009).	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dimensions	  of	  explanatory	  power	  to	  model-­‐based	  explanations.	  We	  aim	  to	  present	  an	  overall	  perspective	  
on	  model-­‐based	  understanding,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  we	  cannot	  provide	  a	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  all	  aspects	  
of	   our	   account.	   At	   these	   points	   we	   direct	   the	   reader	   to	   other	   publications	   in	   which	   the	   specifics	   are	  
developed	  in	  more	  detail.	  
	  
2.	  Explanation	  and	  understanding	  
To	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  explanatory	  use	  of	  models,	  we	  will	  employ	  an	   inferential	  account	  of	  understanding	  
based	  on	  a	  contrastive-­‐counterfactual	  account	  of	  explanation.	  The	  underlying	  motivation	  of	  our	  account	  is	  
realistic:	  The	  aim	  of	  science	   is	   to	   learn	  about	  phenomena	   in	  the	  world	  and	  particularly	  the	  dependencies	  
between	  them.	  These	  dependencies	  are	  objective	   in	   the	  sense	  that	   they	  are	   independent	  of	  our	  ways	  of	  
perceiving,	   conceptualizing	   and	   theorizing	   about	   them.	   Metaphysically,	   we	   are	   pluralists	   about	  
dependence:	   apart	   from	   causal	   dependencies,	   there	   are	   also	   constitutive	   and	   possibly	   formal	   ones,	   and	  
many	   combinations	   of	   these	   (Ylikoski	   2013).	   Knowledge	   of	   these	   dependencies	   constitutes	   scientific	  
understanding.	   However,	   we	   do	   not	   regard	   understanding	   merely	   as	   ”knowing”	   or	   ”believing”	   given	  
propositions.	  Understanding	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  correct	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  concerning	  the	  
phenomenon	  to	  be	  understood	  (Ylikoski	  2009,	  Ylikoski	  &	  Kuorikoski	  2010).	  The	  important	  point	  here	  is	  that	  
understanding	  is	  not	  only	  about	  learning	  and	  memorizing	  true	  propositions,	  but	  about	  the	  capability	  to	  put	  
one’s	  knowledge	  to	  use.	  To	  understand	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  if	  things	  had	  been	  
different,	  what	  would	  happen	   if	   certain	   things	  were	   changed,	  and	  what	  ways	   there	  are	   to	  bring	  about	  a	  
desired	  change	  in	  the	  outcome.	  	  
Our	  notion	  of	  understanding	  is	  factive:	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  just	  any	  inferences	  one	  wishes;	  
one	   must	   get	   those	   inferences	   right.	   The	   correct	   what-­‐if	   inferences	   provide	   a	   natural	   measure	   of	  
understanding:	  one	  understands	  the	  aspects	  of	  phenomenon	  that	  one	  can	  make	  correct	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  
about,	  and	  the	  number	  and	  precision	  of	  correct	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  determines	  how	  much	  one	  understands.	  
This	   implies	   that	   understanding	   is	   not	   an	   all-­‐or-­‐nothing	   affair;	   rather,	   it	   comes	   in	   degrees:	   one	   can	   talk	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about	   a	   very	   narrow	   (or	   even	   superficial)	   understanding,	   but	   also	   about	   deep	   understanding	   that	   is	  
demonstrated	   by	   an	   extensive	   and	   systematic	   ability	   to	   answer	   what-­‐if	   questions.	   Thus,	   one’s	  
understanding	   increases	  when	   the	   scope	  of	   the	  correct	  what-­‐if	   inferences	  expands	   (Ylikoski	  &	  Kuorikoski	  
2010).	  	  Naturally,	  not	  all	  increases	  in	  understanding	  are	  equal	  in	  value:	  the	  focus	  should	  be	  on	  raising	  one’s	  
inferential	  ability	  with	  respect	  to	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  are	  theoretically	  or	  pragmatically	  
important.	  
It	   is	   an	   essential	   aspect	   of	   our	   account	   that	   knowledge	   of	   dependencies	   allows	   the	   making	   of	  
counterfactual	   inferences.	   Explanatory	   knowledge	   is	   not	   about	  what	   happens	   regularly,	   but	   about	  what	  
would	   happen	   if	   things	  were	   different,	   thus	   providing	   grounds	   for	  what-­‐if	   inferences.	   This	   is	   the	   crucial	  
difference	  between	  explanatory	  and	  merely	  descriptive	  information	  (Woodward	  2003).	  This	  modal	  aspect	  
of	  understanding	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  contrastive-­‐counterfactual	  account	  of	  explanation.	  Explanations,	  while	  
tracking	   relations	  of	   dependence	   that	   exist	   independently	   of	   us,	   can	  only	   relate	   to	   things	  described	   in	   a	  
certain	  way.2	  In	  other	  words,	   the	   target	  of	   an	  explanation	   is	   a	   specific	   aspect	  of	   a	  phenomenon,	  not	   the	  
phenomenon	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  is	  captured	  naturally	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  explanations	  are	  answers	  to	  contrastive	  
questions	  (Garfinkel	  1981,	  Hesslow	  1983,	  Lipton	  2004,	  Ylikoski	  2007).	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  why	  things	  are	  
one	  way	  rather	  than	  some	  other	  way;	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  explanandum	  is	  not	  a	  plain	  fact,	  but	  a	  contrastive	  
one.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  contrastive	  explanandum	  helps	  to	  make	  the	  explanation	  more	  explicit	  in	  an	  analytically	  
fruitful	   manner	   (Ylikoski	   2007).	   Spelling	   out	   the	   contrastive	   structure	   forces	   one	   to	   articulate	   what	   the	  
object	  of	  the	  explanation	  is	  and	  in	  which	  respects	  we	  think	  the	  object	  could	  have	  been	  different.	  The	  fact	  
and	   the	   foil(s)	   can	   be	   represented	   as	   alternative	   values	   of	   the	   same	   variable.	   Thus	   the	   foil	   can	   be	   an	  
imagined	  (for	  example	  expected	  or	  predicted)	  value	  of	  the	  variable,	  or	  a	  value	  of	  the	  variable	  at	  some	  other	  
time	  or	  in	  some	  other	  system.	  Explanation	  is	  therefore	  always	  the	  explanation	  of	  differences,	  and	  the	  task	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Although	  realist,	  our	  view	  is	  therefore	  not	  ontic	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  equating	  explanations	  and	  explanatory	  factors.	  
Indeed,	  it	  would	  be	  rather	  strange	  to	  insist	  that	  causes	  and	  mechanisms	  would	  somehow	  do	  the	  explaining	  by	  
themselves.	  As	  has	  been	  noted	  in	  the	  literature,	  little	  of	  substance	  depends	  on	  this	  metaphysical	  (or	  more	  likely	  
grammatical)	  issue	  alone	  (Illari	  2013).	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of	   the	   explanans	   is	   to	   say	   what	   makes	   the	   difference	   (Mackie	   1974,	   Woodward	   2003,	   Waters	   2007,	  
Strevens	  2008).	  	  
Explanation	   and	   understanding	   are	   not	   different	   kinds	   of	   activities,	   mental	   processes	   or	   methods.	  
Successful	   explanations	   convey	   the	   ability	   to	   provide	   answers	   to	   contrastive	   what-­‐if	   questions,	   and	  
understanding	   is	  based	  on	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  that	  provides	  the	  basis	   for	  these	  answers.	  However,	   it	   is	  
important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  inferential	  account	  of	  understanding	  does	  not	  conceive	  of	  understanding	  as	  
a	   kind	   of	   special	  mental	   state.	   It	   is	   neither	   a	   privately	   accessible	   sensation	   or	   experience	   nor	   a	   state	   of	  
mind.	   This	   is	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   criteria	   for	   attributing	   understanding	   are	   public.	  When	   judging	  
whether	  someone	  understands	  something,	  people	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  look	  into	  the	  person’s	  mind;	  rather,	  
they	   set	   out	   to	   observe	   whether	   he	   or	   she	   can	   make	   relevant	   counterfactual	   inferences	   about	   the	  
phenomenon	  in	  question.	  Having	  an	  appropriate	  mental	  model	  might	  be	  a	  precondition	  of	  understanding,	  
but	   unlike	   some	   accounts	   of	   understanding	   inspired	   by	   cognitive	   science	   (Waskan	   2006),	   the	   inferential	  
approach	   does	   not	   equate	   understanding	   with	   having	   the	   right	   kind	   of	   mental	   model	   (Ylikoski	   2009;	  
Kuorikoski	   2011).	   After	   all,	   the	   correctness	   of	   internal	   mental	   models	   is	   judged	   according	   to	   manifest	  
inferential	  performance,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  	  
Having	   a	   behavioral	   notion	   of	   understanding	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   distinguish	   between	   actually	  
understanding	  something	  and	  merely	  thinking	  that	  one	  understands	  it	  (Ylikoski	  2009;	  Kuorikoski	  2011):	  one	  
of	   the	   key	   points	   of	   the	   inferential	   account	   is	   the	   distinction	   between	   understanding	   and	   the	   sense	   of	  
understanding.	  The	  latter	  is	  the	  feeling	  that	  tells	  us	  when	  we	  have	  understood	  or	  grasped	  something.	  This	  
sense	  of	  confidence	  can	  be	  easily	  confused	  with	  the	  ability	  that	  it	  indicates.	  Ideally,	  understanding	  and	  the	  
sense	   of	   understanding	   would	   go	   hand	   in	   hand.	   However,	   empirical	   studies	   show	   that	   the	   sense	   of	  
understanding	   is	   a	   highly	   fallible	   indicator	   of	   understanding.	   People	   often	   overestimate	   the	   detail,	  
coherence,	  and	  depth	  of	  their	  understanding	  (Rozenblit	  and	  Keil	  2002,	  Keil	  2003).	  This	  illusion	  of	  depth	  of	  
understanding	  can	  also	  influence	  scientific	  cognition	  (Ylikoski	  2009)	  and,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  it	  is	  an	  ever-­‐present	  
danger	  in	  modeling.	  	  
Another	   advantage	   of	   having	   a	   non-­‐mentalistic	   notion	   of	   understanding	   is	   that	   it	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	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consider	   cases	   of	   extended	   and	   collective	   understanding.	   Recent	   work	   on	   cognition	   has	   increasingly	  
emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  external	  cognitive	  tools	  (extended	  cognition,	  Clark	  2008)	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
social	   division	   of	   epistemic	   labor	   (distributed	   cognition,	   Hutchins	   1995)	   in	   scientific	   cognition.	   Scientific	  
understanding	   is	   essentially	   collective.	   	   Scientific	   understanding	   proper	   is	   not	   what	   happens	   inside	  
individual	  minds,	  but	   is	  constituted	  by	  the	  collective	  abilities	  of	  the	  scientific	  community	  to	  reason	  about	  
and	  manipulate	   the	  objects	  of	   investigation.	  Given	   the	  ubiquity	  of	  extended	  and	  distributed	  cognition,	   it	  
would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  focus	  the	  analysis	  exclusively	  on	  unaided	  individual	  cognition.	  Things	  that	  go	  on	  in	  
individual	  minds	  are	  only	  indirectly	  related	  (through	  their	  public	  inferential	  performances)	  to	  our	  collective	  
understanding	   of	   the	   world.	   The	   focus	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   on	   extended	   cognition,	   and	   we	   suggest	   that	   it	  
provides	   a	   natural	   way	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   contributions	   of	   modeling	   and	   simulation	   to	   scientific	  
understanding.	  
	  
3.	  Models	  as	  extended	  cognition	  
Suppose	   one	   wants	   to	   explain	   why	   cities	   are	   so	   often	   ethnically	   segregated	   (or	   alternatively	   why	  
workplaces	  are	  segregated	  by	  gender).	  This	  is	  a	  contrastive	  explanandum,	  where	  the	  fact	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  
segregation	  and	  the	  foil	  is	  its	  absence.	  One	  would	  like	  to	  know	  what	  makes	  the	  difference	  between	  these	  
two	   states	   of	   affairs.	   In	   order	   to	   find	   such	   a	   variable,	   one	   must	   hypothesize	   about	   the	   possible	   causal	  
processes	  that	  influence	  how	  people	  choose	  the	  place	  they	  live	  in.	  Such	  mechanistic	  knowledge	  can	  also	  be	  
used	  to	  infer	  what	  the	  dependence	  itself	  would	  have	  been	  like,	  if	  the	  parts	  or	  their	  organization	  had	  been	  
different.	  However,	  keeping	  these	  kinds	  of	   inferences	  and	  commitments	   in	  order	   is	  not	  a	  trivial	   task.	  The	  
capacity	   of	   the	   human	   working	   memory	   is	   very	   limited	   and	   mental	   reasoning	   is	   sequential,	   making	  
inferential	   tasks	   about	   a	  multitude	  of	   interdependent	   changes,	   subject	   to	   a	  number	  of	   constraints	   to	  be	  
simultaneously	  satisfied,	  next	  to	  impossible	  to	  carry	  out	  by	  brainpower	  alone.	  	  
The	  first	  task	  is	  to	  simplify	  the	  object	  of	  analysis.	  While	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  is	  to	  explain	  segregation	  in	  a	  real	  
city,	   like	  Chicago	  or	  Detroit,	   it	   is	  extremely	  difficult	   to	  gain	  an	   inferential	  grasp	  without	  abstracting	  away	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from	  the	  concrete	  details.	  Cities	  are	  large,	  and	  they	  involve	  highly	  complex	  causal	  processes.	  Furthermore,	  
there	  is	  an	  acute	  lack	  of	  information	  about	  the	  details	  of	  the	  processes.	  One	  way	  to	  proceed	  is	  to	  stylize	  the	  
explanandum	  and	  create	  a	  simplified	  artificial	  representation	  of	  it.	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  only	  represent	  the	  crucial	  
aspects	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   and	   leave	   everything	   else	   out.	   An	   extreme	   way	   to	   simplify	   the	   city	   is	   to	  
consider	  it	  as	  a	  large	  checkerboard.	  A	  checkerboard	  is	  not	  much	  like	  a	  real	  city,	  but	  if	  you	  have	  two	  kinds	  of	  
items	  occupying	  its	  squares,	  you	  can	  create	  observable	  segregation.	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  use	  this	  simple	  and	  easy	  
representation	   as	   a	   surrogate	   of	   a	   real	   city	   and	   to	   study	   what	   kinds	   of	   processes	   can	   bring	   about	  
segregation	  in	  it,	  and	  then	  hypothesize	  that	  similar	  processes	  could	  produce	  segregation	  in	  real	  cities.	  
This	  is	  the	  basic	  idea	  of	  the	  famous	  checkerboard	  model	  by	  Thomas	  Schelling3.	  His	  idea	  was	  to	  assume	  that	  
the	   agents,	   which	   can	   be	   taken	   as	   individuals	   or	   families,	   populate	   a	   checkerboard-­‐like	   neighborhood	  
where	  some	  slots	  are	  empty	  and	  available	  for	  occupation	  by	  agents	  who	  are	  not	  satisfied	  with	  their	  current	  
neighborhood.	   The	   agents	   are	   assumed	   to	   have	   preferences	   concerning	   the	   ethnic	   composition	   of	   their	  
neighborhood	  and	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  model	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  a	  segregated	  neighborhood	  might	  arise	  from	  
these	  preferences.	  Let	  us	  assume	  that	  there	  are	  only	  two	  kinds	  of	  agents,	  and	  let	  us	  call	  them	  A’s	  and	  B’s.	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  model	  is	  that	  agents	  will	  move	  to	  new	  (randomly	  assigned)	  slots	  until	  they	  are	  satisfied	  with	  
the	  composition	  of	  their	  neighborhood.	  
If	   the	   agents	   prefer	   to	   be	   in	   the	  majority	   in	   their	   neighborhood,	   it	   is	   quite	   easy	   to	   figure	   out	  what	  will	  
happen	   if	   they	   can	   freely	  move	  around.	   The	  agents’	   attempts	   to	  be	   in	   the	  majority	  by	  moving	   to	   a	  new	  
location	  change	  the	  composition	  of	  both	  old	  and	  new	  locations.	  The	  neighborhood	  they	  leave	  becomes	  less	  
attractive	   to	  members	   of	   their	   own	   group	   and	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   new	   neighborhood	   becomes	   less	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  checkerboard	  model	  is	  perhaps	  also	  the	  most	  used	  stock	  example	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  social	  science	  literature,	  
and	  worries	  have	  been	  raised	  that	  using	   it	   repeatedly	  may	  have	  created	  biases	   in	  philosophical	  views.	  Granted,	   the	  
checkerboard	  model	  might	  not	  be	   representative	  of	   economic	  and	   sociological	  models	   in	   general.	  However,	   as	   the	  
model	  has	  been	  heralded	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  good	  explanation	  in	  social	  sciences	  (Sugden	  2000,	  Hedström	  &	  Ylikoski	  
2010),	  it	  must	  embody	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  key	  virtues	  that	  social	  scientists	  expect	  their	  theoretical	  models	  to	  have.	  
Secondly,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  in	  the	  present	  context	  it	  just	  provides	  a	  simple	  and	  well-­‐known	  example	  to	  illustrate	  
our	  points	  about	  using	  external	   representations	   in	   science.	  Nothing	   in	  our	  argument	  depends	  on	   the	  choice	  of	   this	  
specific	  example.	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attractive	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  other	  group.	  Intuitively	  it	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  the	  agents	  will	  move	  around	  
until	   they	  are	  satisfied	   in	  a	   fully	  segregated	  neighborhood.	  This	   is	  not	  a	  particularly	  exciting	  result,	  and	   it	  
can	  be	  reached	  without	  a	  formal	  model.	  However,	  a	  more	  interesting	  question	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  ways	  to	  
bring	  about	  segregation	  without	  people	  preferring	  it.	  	  
One	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   perhaps	   the	   simple	   aversion	   to	   being	   in	   a	   clear	   minority	   with	   respect	   to	   one’s	  
neighbors	   could	   be	   enough	   to	   lead	   to	   strongly	   segregated	   neighborhoods.	   A	   random	  move	   in	   an	   evenly	  
distributed	  cityscape	  could	  then	  lead	  to	  someone	  else	  suddenly	  finding	  herself	  belonging	  to	  a	  local	  minority	  
and	  thus	  wanting	  to	  move.	  This	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  chain	  reaction	  ending	  up	  with	  segregated	  areas,	  although	  
no-­‐one	  would	   really	   prefer	   to	   live	   in	   such	   an	   arrangement.	   The	   idea	   of	   a	   cascade	   like	   this	   is	   intuitively	  
plausible,	  but	  is	  it	  really	  a	  possible	  explanation	  for	  segregation?	  The	  choices	  of	  agents	  are	  interdependent,	  
and	   this	   makes	   deducing	   collective	   outcomes	   very	   difficult.	   Similarly,	   the	   conditions	   under	   which	   such	  
cascades	  are	  to	  be	  expected	  (the	  kind	  of	  preferences	  that	  are	  required,	  how	  the	  size	  of	  the	  neighborhood	  
the	   agents	   see	   affects	   the	   process,	   what	   kind	   of	   neighborhood	   structures	   are	   vulnerable,	   etc.)	   are	  
completely	  beyond	  unaided	  reasoning.	  
A	  way	  to	  alleviate	   the	  cognitive	   load	  and	   increase	   the	  reliability	  of	   these	   inferences	   is	   to	  write	  down	  the	  
assumptions	  and	  hypothetical	  changes.	  In	  this	  way,	  keeping	  in	  check	  what	  else	  has	  to	  be	  changed	  when	  a	  
particular	  assumption	  is	  changed	  becomes	  manageable	  since	  the	  bookkeeping	  is	  externalized	  to	  an	  outside	  
medium.	  While	  in	  principle	  there	  is	  nothing	  wrong	  with	  natural	   language,	  the	  language	  of	  mathematics	   is	  
better	  suited	  to	  handling	  inferences	  regarding	  functional	  dependencies.	  In	  addition,	  it	  is	  also	  convenient	  in	  
that	   mathematical	   inferences	   are,	   if	   done	   correctly,	   automatically	   truth-­‐preserving.	   Using	   a	   formal	  
language	   forces	   the	   reasoner	   to	  explicate	   implicit	   assumptions,	   and	  makes	   the	   comparison	  of	   inferences	  
from	  similar	  yet	  different	  assumptions	  easier.	  
This	   is	  what	  many	  sociologists	  and	  economists	   following	  Schelling’s	   idea	  have	  been	  doing	   (Bruch	  &	  Mare	  
2006,	   2009;	   Clark	  &	   Fossett	   2008;	   Fossett	   2006;	  Macy	  &	   van	   de	   Rijt	   2006;	  Muldoon,	   Smith	  &	  Weisberg	  
2012).	  They	  have	  shown	  that	  segregation	  indeed	  arises	  due	  to	  the	  ‘tipping	  point’	  phenomenon,	  where	  the	  
first	  moves	  of	  even	  a	  few	  dissatisfied	  agents	  can	  create	  an	   incentive	  for	  others	  to	  move.	  This	  results	   in	  a	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cascade	  of	  relocation	  that	  only	  ends	  when	  the	  whole	  board	  has	  become	  highly	  segregated.	  One	  surprising	  
finding	  of	   these	  models	   is	   that	   even	   if	   the	   agents	   only	  wish	   to	   avoid	  being	   in	   a	   too	   small	  minority	   –	   for	  
example,	   less	   than	  a	   third	   in	   their	  neighborhood	  –	  a	   segregation	  dynamic	  will	   still	   emerge.	  Furthermore,	  
this	  result	   is	  rather	  robust:	  one	  can	  make	  the	  model	  more	  complex,	  but	  the	  same	  segregated	  equilibrium	  
will	  still	  follow.	  Thus,	  counterintuitively,	  even	  tolerance	  can	  lead	  to	  segregation.	  	  
Such	   outsourcing	   of	   inferential	   work	   to	   external	   representational	   aids	   is	   a	   paradigmatic	   example	   of	  
extended	  cognition	  (Clark	  2008).	  In	  the	  inferential	  view,	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  whether	  the	  model	  is	  a	  mental	  
model,	  a	  physical	  object,	  a	  set	  of	  equations,	  or	  a	  computer	  program.	  What	  matters	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  it	  to	  
make	  correct	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  about	  the	  object	  of	  interest.	  When	  the	  inferences	  from	  the	  assumptions	  to	  
the	  explanandum	  are	  accomplished	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  an	  external	  medium	  (such	  as	  pen	  and	  paper,	  computer,	  
or	  a	  checkerboard),	  and	  a	  set	  of	  formal	  truth-­‐preserving	  inferential	  rules,	  the	  relevant	  cognitive	  system	  is	  
not	   the	   modeler	   alone,	   but	   the	   model-­‐modeler	   pair	   (Kuorikoski	   and	   Lehtinen	   2009).	   This	   makes	   the	  
extended	   cognitive	   system	   composed	   of	   the	   modeler	   and	   the	   external	   inferential	   apparatus	   the	  
understanding	  subject,	  whose	  inferential	  performance	  is	  constitutive	  of	  understanding.	  
This	  may	  sound	  unintuitive,	  since	  we	  automatically	  associate	  the	  concept	  of	  understanding	  with	  something	  
that	   takes	   place	   in	   the	   mind	   (or	   consciousness)	   of	   the	   scientist.	   As	   we	   argued	   above,	   this	   is	   a	   serious	  
mistake.	   What	   is	   confined	   to	   the	   mind	   of	   the	   scientist	   is	   the	   metacognitive	   state	   of	   a	   sense	   of	  
understanding.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   metacognition	   about	   understanding,	   and	   understanding	   itself,	  
separate,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  that	  is	  epistemically	  primary.	  From	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  epistemic	  and	  explanatory	  
progress,	   it	   makes	   little	   difference	   whether	   all	   the	   inferential	   work	   is	   confined	   within	   the	   brain	   of	   the	  
scientists	   –	   and	   even	   less	   difference	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   scientists	   happen	   to	   experience	   the	  
phenomenological	   sense	  of	  understanding	  while	  doing	   the	   inferential	  work.	  The	  goal	  of	   science	   is	  not	   to	  
provide	  satisfying	  experiences	  to	  scientists	  –	  this	  could	  certainly	  be	  achieved	  using	  less	  resources	  –	  but	  to	  
increase	  our	  collective	  ability	  to	  make	  correct	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  about	  the	  world.	  
When	   the	   use	   of	   models	   is	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   extended	   cognition,	   some	   worries	   about	   their	  
explanatory	   value	   turn	   out	   to	   be	  misguided.	   For	   example,	   Alexandrova	   and	   Northcott	   (2013)	   deny	   that	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(economic)	  models	  as	  such	  explain	  at	  all,	  and	  that	  they	  only	  have	  a	  heuristic	  explanatory	  use	  in	  suggesting	  
possible	   explanations.	   In	   our	   view,	   models	   always	   comprise	   only	   a	   part	   of	   the	   explanatory	   inferential	  
practice.	   Therefore	   the	   distinction	   between	   heuristic	   and	   explanatory	   use	   is	   vague,	   at	   best.	   The	   role	   of	  
models	   is	   to	   facilitate	   inferences	   from	   assumptions,	   sometimes	   in	   a	  way	  which	   allows	   completely	   novel	  
inferences	  to	  be	  made,	  but	  quite	  often	  only	  by	  forcing	  the	  modeler	  to	  be	  more	  explicit	  in	  her	  assumptions	  
and	  making	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  inferences	  easier	  to	  check.	  A	  model,	  understood	  as	  an	  external	  inferential	  aid	  
in	   an	   extended	   cognitive	   system,	   is	   explanatorily	   sterile	   if	   it	   does	   not	   improve	   the	   range	  or	   reliability	   of	  
explanatory	   inferences.	   In	   such	  cases,	   the	  model	   is	  used	  mainly	   to	   illustrate	   the	  modeler’s	  mathematical	  
abilities	  and	  may	  also	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  illusion	  of	  depth	  of	  understanding.	  This	  might	  indeed	  be	  the	  case	  with	  
many	  economic	  models,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  an	  intrinsic	  feature	  of	  all	  model-­‐based	  reasoning.	  	  
Therefore	  there	  are	  (at	  least)	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  models	  can	  enhance	  scientific	  understanding:	  they	  oblige	  
scientists	   to	  be	  more	  explicit	  about	  their	  assumptions,	   they	  can	  make	  their	   inferences	  more	  reliable,	  and	  
they	  can	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  correct	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  that	  the	  scientists	  are	  able	  to	  make.	  
First,	  building	  a	   formal	  model	   forces	  theorists	  to	  be	  more	  explicit	  about	  their	  assumptions.	   In	  contrast	  to	  
verbal	  theorizing,	  formal	  and	  computational	  modeling	  does	  not	  allow	  implicit	  assumptions	  within	  a	  model.	  
Everything	  that	  goes	  into	  the	  formal	  model	  must	  be	  explicitly	  defined	  or	  coded,	  which,	  in	  principle,	  makes	  it	  
easier	  to	  evaluate	  the	  assumptions	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  consistency,	  realism,	  and	  relevance.	  However,	  
it	   is	   important	   to	   recognize	   that	  model	  building	  does	  not	   completely	  do	  away	  with	   implicit	   assumptions.	  
The	  assumptions	  that	  guide	  the	  inferences	  from	  the	  model	  to	  the	  target	  system	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  model,	  
so	   they	  might	   remain	   implicit.	   For	   example,	   the	  model	   of	   residential	   segregation	  might	   not	   include	   the	  
activities	  of	  housing	  agencies,	  while	  in	  the	  real	  world	  they	  may	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  Thus	  the	  (implicit	  or	  
explicit)	   assumptions	   about	   the	   effects	   of	   housing	   agencies	   will	   guide	   the	   inferences	   that	   the	   theorist	  
makes	  from	  the	  model	  to	  the	  real-­‐world	  housing	  patterns.	  Formalization	  may	  also	  introduce	  further	  implicit	  
assumptions	   that	  may	   go	   unnoticed	   especially	   in	   cases	  where	   the	  modeler	   or	   the	  modeling	   community	  
does	  not	  fully	  understand	  the	  modeling	  framework	  itself.	  	  
Second,	   the	  use	  of	  models	  makes	   the	   inferences	  more	   reliable.	  Both	  psychological	   science	  and	  everyday	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experience	   show	   that	  unaided	  human	   reasoning	   is	  not	   very	   reliable.	  We	  are	  victims	   to	   limitations	   in	  our	  
working	   memory,	   various	   biases,	   and,	   of	   course,	   errors.	   The	   frequency	   in	   which	   the	   results	   of	   formal	  
models	  and	  computer	   simulations	  are	   found	  surprising	  and	  unintuitive	  demonstrates	   the	   fallibility	  of	  our	  
reasoning	  abilities.	  By	  externalizing	  some	  of	  the	  inferences,	  we	  can	  increase	  their	  reliability.	  Naturally,	  the	  
use	  of	  external	  aids	  is	  not	  a	  miracle	  cure.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  computer	  simulation,	  although	  we	  can	  
almost	   always	   trust	   the	   machine	   to	   execute	   the	   code	   correctly,	   simulations	   have	   other	   sources	   of	  
unreliability.	  Bugs	  in	  the	  code,	  idiosyncratic	  programming	  habits,	  difficulties	  in	  comparing	  simulations	  built	  
in	   different	   programming	   languages	   (or	   platforms),	   and	   a	   lack	   of	   sufficient	   commentary	   all	   present	  
challenges	  to	  simulation-­‐aided	  scientific	  inferences.	  
Finally,	   extended	   cognition	   expands	   the	   number	   of	   what-­‐if	   inferences	   that	   one	   is	   able	   to	   make,	   as	  
suggested	  above.	  As	  also	  suggested	  above,	  the	  use	  of	  formal	  modeling	  and	  computer	  simulation	  removes	  
some	  of	  the	  restrictions	  that	  our	  verbal	  reasoning	  skills	  place	  on	  our	  inferential	  abilities.	  For	  example,	  with	  
agent-­‐based	   simulations	   of	   segregation	   processes	   one	   can	   systematically	   study	   how	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  
assumptions	   change	   the	   outcomes.	   Defining	   the	   extra	   understanding	   provided	   by	   the	   external	   aids	   of	  
cognition	  is	  easy	  in	  principle:	  we	  simply	  compare	  which	  correct	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  the	  scientists	  are	  able	  to	  
make	  with	   and	  without	   them.	   Similarly,	  we	   can	   study	  whether	   the	   employment	   of	   external	   aids	   creates	  
illusory	   understanding	   by	   determining	   whether	   they	   increase	   (or	   decrease)	   the	   number	   of	   false	   beliefs	  
about	  our	  real	  inferential	  abilities.	  
	  
4.	  Understanding	  the	  model	  –	  or	  the	  joys	  and	  follies	  of	  conceptual	  exploration	  
Models	  are	  external	   inferential	  aids	  used	  to	  generate	  explanations	  from	  the	  assumptions	  at	  hand.	   It	  goes	  
without	   saying	   that	   using	   such	   apparatuses	   is	   not	   usually	   a	   trivial	   task.	   It	   is	   therefore	   important	   to	  
distinguish	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   model	   from	   understanding	   with	   the	   model,	   i.e.,	   the	   empirical	  
understanding	   of	   phenomena	   possibly	   facilitated	   by	   the	  model.	   According	   to	   the	   inferentialist	   view,	   the	  
understanding	  of	  a	  model	  consists	  of	  the	  abilities	  to	  manipulate	  the	  external	  inferential	  apparatus:	  in	  order	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to	  understand	  a	  model,	  one	  needs	  to	  understand	  how	  model	  properties	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  local	  changes	  
in	  the	  assumptions.	  This	  involves	  not	  only	  the	  ability	  to	  “solve”	  the	  model	  	  (i.e.	  to	  deduce	  a	  specific	  model	  
result),	  but	  also	  the	  ability	  to	  adapt	  the	  model	  (or	  the	  modeling	  framework)	  to	  novel	  situations,	  the	  ability	  
to	  anticipate	  what	  kinds	  of	   ingredients	  fit	  together,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	   judge	  which	  parts	  of	  the	  model	  are	  
most	  crucial	  for	  empirical	  applicability.	  Just	  as	  with	  understanding	  in	  general,	  understanding	  a	  model	  is	  not	  
an	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  affair:	  one	  can	  understand	  the	  model	  to	  different	  degrees.	  	  
Usually	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   model	   is	   acquired	   by	   manipulating	   the	   model:	   by	   proving	   new	  
mathematical	   results,	   by	   computationally	   exploring	   its	   properties	   under	   various	   parameterizations,	  
alternative	   discretizations	   etc.,	   and	   generally	   by	   simply	   “toying	   with	   it.”	   Such	   purely	   non-­‐empirical	  
“conceptual	   exploration”	   (cf.	   Hausman	   1992)	   can	   therefore	   have	   a	   perfectly	   legitimate	   epistemic	   role	   in	  
providing	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  inferential	  tools,	  and	  can	  thus	  indirectly	  contribute	  to	  the	  growth	  
of	  empirical	  understanding.	  Of	  course,	  such	  mathematical	  exploration	  can	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  
using	   the	  models	   to	   infer	   about	   the	  world,	   and	   degenerate	   into	   an	   empirically	   sterile	   research	   program	  
with	  little	  epistemic	  value	  (an	  accusation	  often	  raised	  against	  theoretical	  microeconomics).	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  simulation	  models,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  simulators	  increasingly	  do	  not	  build	  
their	  simulations	  from	  the	  ground	  up.	  Rather,	  they	  employ	  ready-­‐made	  software	  libraries	  or	  modify	  existing	  
simulations	  built	  by	  others.	  When	  this	  happens,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  simulator	  is	  not	  familiar	  with	  all	  of	  the	  
assumptions	   underlying	   the	   simulation.	   Thus	   it	   is	   important	   to	   distinguish	   between	   merely	   using	   a	  
simulation	  and	   fully	  understanding	  how	   it	  works.	  When	  a	  simulation	   is	  used	  merely	  as	  an	   inferential	  aid,	  
the	  user	  has	  a	  very	   limited	  understanding	  of	   the	  underlying	  mechanisms.	   In	   this	  case,	   the	  scientist	   is	  not	  
able	  to	  infer	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  simulation	  were	  changed,	  nor	  would	  he	  or	  she	  be	  able	  
to	   determine	  what	   the	   proper	   domain	   of	   the	   simulation’s	   application	   is.	   The	   same	   point	   also	   applies	   to	  
other	  kinds	  of	  models,	  although	  the	  problem	  is	  more	  salient	  in	  the	  case	  of	  computer	  simulations	  because	  
they	  allow	  apparent	  inferential	  facility	  with	  a	  very	  shallow	  understanding	  of	  the	  model.	  
Understanding	  a	  model	  template	  is	  also	  often	  facilitated	  by	  specific	  narratives	  related	  to	  the	  model.	  Game	  
theoretic	  model	  templates	  are	  excellent	  examples	  of	  this.	  Prisoner’s	  dilemma,	  Battle	  of	  the	  sexes	  and	  Stag	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hunt	  are	  all	  taught	  by	  telling	  characteristic	  little	  stories	  that	  lay	  out	  the	  essential	   incentive	  structures	  that	  
define	   these	   models.	   Such	   use	   of	   narrative	   structures,	   therefore,	   has	   an	   important,	   though	   indirect,	  
epistemic	  role	  in	  mobilizing	  the	  cognitive	  resources	  related	  to	  familiar	  everyday	  events	  towards	  the	  task	  of	  
understanding	  the	  model	  (see	  Morgan	  2012,	  chapters	  6	  and	  9).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  acknowledgment	  of	  this	  
indirect	  role	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  claiming	  that	  model-­‐based	  explanation	  –	  understanding	  with	  the	  model	  –	  
requires	  a	  narrative	  underpinning.	  	  
The	   achieved	   inferential	   prowess	   in	   manipulating	   the	   model	   itself	   can	   be	   mistaken	   for	   an	   increased	  
understanding	  of	   the	  modeled	  phenomena	  –	  especially	  when	  accompanied	  by	  a	   sense	  of	  understanding.	  
This	  is	  an	  important	  case	  of	  the	  illusion	  of	  depth	  of	  understanding	  (Ylikoski	  2009;	  Kuorikoski	  2011)	  related	  
to	  model-­‐based	  cognition.	  A	  mere	  increase	  in	  the	  proficiency	  of	  making	  inferences	  within	  the	  model	  does	  
not	  automatically	   imply	  that	  the	  modeler	  also	  has	  an	   improved	  ability	  to	  make	  correct	  what-­‐if	   inferences	  
about	  the	  intended	  empirical	  target.	  Using	  the	  model	  to	  actually	  explain	  something	  also	  requires	  additional	  
background	  knowledge	  and	  know-­‐how	  that	  is	  not	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  “the	  model”	  itself.	  Thus	  understanding	  
of	  the	  model	  is	  only	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  understanding	  something	  with	  the	  model.	  	  
	  
5.	  Understanding	  with	  the	  model	  
If	   the	   model	   allows	   drawing	   correct	   what-­‐if	   inferences	   concerning	   the	   consequences	   of	   hypothetical	  
changes	  in	  the	  modeling	  assumptions	  corresponding	  to	  explanatory	  factors	  (alternative	  values	  of	  variables	  
or	   parameters),	   then	   it	   has	   explanatory	   content	   beyond	   merely	   a	   re-­‐description	   and	   re-­‐organization	   of	  
data.	  The	  explanatory	  dependencies	  captured	   in	  a	  model	  may	  be	  causal	  or	  constitutive.	  But	  what	  exactly	  
does	  it	  mean	  that	  the	  model	  “captures”	  such	  a	  dependency?	  The	  philosophical	  literature	  on	  modeling	  has	  
looked	   for	   a	   special	   relation	   between	   the	   model	   and	   its	   target	   that	   could,	   in	   some	   sense,	   explain	   this	  
epistemic	  role	  of	  the	  model.	  This	  relation	  would	  then	  be	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  puzzle	  of	  modeling:	  how	  
can	   the	  manipulation	   of	   these	   surrogate	   systems	   provide	   genuinely	   new	   empirical	   understanding	   of	   the	  
world?	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Since	  most	  models	  are	  not	  sentential	  in	  structure,	  the	  semantic	  relation	  of	  truth	  is	  not	  usually	  considered	  a	  
viable	   candidate	   for	   this	   role.	   Indeed,	   the	   common	   view,	   also	   among	   modelers,	   is	   that	   all	   models	   are	  
literally	  false.	  Since	  models	  are	  often	  taken	  to	  be	  mathematical	  structures,	  	  various	  mappings	  (isomorphism	  
[van	   Fraassen	   1980],	   homomorphism	   [Bartels	   2006],	   partial	   isomorphism	   [French	   2003])	   have	   been	  
suggested	  to	  be	  “the”	  relation	  explaining	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  models,	  but	  none	  have	  exhibited	  the	  right	  
formal	  properties	  or	  have	  saved	  all	  of	  the	  central	  intuitions	  (Suárez	  2003).4	  Other	  proposed	  concepts,	  such	  
as	  similarity	  (Giere	  2004)	  or	  credibility	  (Sugden	  2000),	  are	  vague,	  and	  as	  such	  are	  mere	  placeholders	  for	  a	  
proper	  explanatory	  account.	  	  
Various	   pragmatic	   approaches	   to	   representation	   introduce	   the	   users’	   intentions	   into	   the	   picture,	   thus	  
providing	   the	   directionality	   of	   the	   representation	   relationship	   (Giere	   2004;	   Mäki	   2009)	   lacking	   in	   the	  
structural	  mapping	  accounts.	  Other	  accounts	  emphasizing	  ‘interpretation’	  (Contessa	  2011)	  or	  ‘denotation’	  
(Hughes	  1997)	  also	  depend	  on	  the	  intentionality	  of	  the	  modeler	  in	  establishing	  the	  aboutness	  of	  the	  model.	  
However,	   if	   representation	   is	   grounded	   primarily	   on	   the	   specific	   goals	   and	   representing	   activities	   of	  
humans	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  representative	  vehicle	  and	  the	  target	  object,	  then	  the	  idea	  that	  
there	   is	   something	   objective	   about	   the	   representation	   relation	   having	   to	   do	   with	   the	   properties	   of	   the	  
model	  and	  the	  target	  system	  is	  missed,	  and	  it	  becomes	  questionable	  whether	  the	  representation	  relation	  
itself	   does	   any	   explanatory	   work	   (Knuuttila	   2011).	   Another	   danger	   in	   stressing	   the	   intentions	   of	   the	  
modeler	  is	  conceiving	  representation	  as	  a	  mysterious	  mental	  act	  –	  as	  if	   intentionality	   in	  one’s	  mind	  could	  
magically	  create	  a	   relationship	  between	  a	  model	  and	  the	  world.	  This	  way	  of	  conceptualizing	  aboutness	  –	  
conceiving	   intending	   as	   a	   special	   mental	   act	   that	   a-­‐causally	   endows	   utterances	   with	   their	   meanings,	   or	  
things	  with	  their	  representational	  content	  –	  was	  identified	  as	  a	  form	  of	  mythical	  thinking	  and	  subsequently	  
refuted	  by	  Wittgenstein	  (1953).	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  avoiding	  in	  the	  context	  of	  models.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Suárez	   (2003)	   presents	   arguments	   based	   on	   the	   variety	   of	   ways	   of	   representation,	   the	   logical	   properties	   of	   the	  
representation	   relation,	   the	   necessity	   of	   accounting	   for	   misrepresentation,	   and	   nonsufficiency	   and	   nonnecessity	  
arguments,	   to	   persuasively	   discredit	   proposed	   philosophical	   accounts	   of	   “the”	   representation	   relation	   between	  
scientific	  models	  and	  their	  targets.	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If	  we	  take	  model-­‐based	  (explanatory)	  reasoning	  to	  simply	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  drawing	  conclusions	  from	  given	  
assumptions	  using	  external	   inferential	   aids,	   there	   is	  nothing	   further	   to	  be	  explained	  about	   the	  epistemic	  
role	  of	  models.	  There	  is	  no	  epistemic	  puzzle	  concerning	  how	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  surrogate	  system	  can	  
provide	  new	  empirical	  knowledge	  about	  the	  target,	  since	  the	  manipulation	   itself	  constitutes	  an	   inference	  
from	   the	  modeling	   assumptions	   to	   a	   conclusion	   carried	   out	   by	   the	   extended	   cognitive	   system.	   The	   only	  
remaining	  epistemic	  questions	   concern	   the	   truth	  of	   the	  assumptions	  and	   the	   reliability	  of	   the	   inferences	  
(Kuorikoski	   and	   Lehtinen	   2009).	   However,	   if	   we	   adopt	   an	   inferential	   perspective	   on	   representation	   in	  
particular	  (Suárez	  2004,	  Vorms	  2011)	  and	  aboutness	  in	  general	  (Brandom	  1994),	  then	  the	  representational	  
properties	  of	  models	   are	   accounted	   for	   in	   a	   straightforward	  manner:	   a	  model	   (as	   an	  external	   inferential	  
apparatus)	   represents	   some	   real	   world	   phenomenon	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   (and	   to	   the	   extent	   that)	  
some	   cognitive	   agent	   (modeler)	   can	   use	   the	   apparatus	   to	   make	   correct	   inferences	   concerning	   the	  
phenomenon.	  If	  the	  new	  inferences	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  model	  include	  counterfactual	  what-­‐if	  inferences,	  
then	  the	  model	   is	  explanatory	  and	  represents	  some	  crucial	  dependencies	   related	  to	   the	  phenomenon	  by	  
virtue	  of	  facilitating	  these	  inferences.	  	  
For	  some,	  explaining	  representation	  in	  terms	  of	  inferences	  seems	  counterintuitive	  or	  “thin”	  (e.g.,	  Contessa	  
2011).	  After	   all,	   the	  hope	  was	   that	   the	   representation	   relation	  would	   explain	   the	   epistemic	   value	  of	   the	  
model.	   Thus	   the	   philosophical	   deflationism	   of	   the	   inferentialist	   account	   of	   representation	   may	   feel	  
disappointing	   or	   even	   problematic	   to	   some.	   However,	   to	   say	   that	   the	   relation	   of	   representation	   is	  
constituted	   by	   the	   inferential	   “affordances”	   of	   the	   model	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   relation	   is	   somehow	  
arbitrary,	  “subjective,”	  or	  mysterious.	  It	  is	  certainly	  not	  arbitrary	  that	  a	  specific	  diagram,	  set	  of	  equations,	  
or	   physical	   scale	   model	   is	   more	   helpful	   in	   inferring	   about	   a	   specific	   target	   phenomenon	   than	   some	  
alternatives.	  And	  this	  depends	  as	  much	  on	  the	  intrinsic	  properties	  of	  the	  inferential	  apparatus	  as	  it	  does	  on	  
the	  cognitive	  make-­‐up	  and	  perceptual	  abilities	  of	  the	  model	  user.5	  It	  is	  no	  accident	  that	  movable	  tokens	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  representational	  properties	  of	  a	  model	  are	  still	  defined	  in	  relation	  (and	  in	  this	  sense	  “subjective”)	  
to	  the	  cognitive	  agent	  using	  the	  model.	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	  subjective	  or	  relative	  about	  the	  correctness,	  range,	  
and	  reliability	  of	  the	  inferences	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  extended	  cognitive	  system.	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a	   grid	   provide	   a	   good	   way	   for	   beings	   equipped	   with	   vision	   and	   hands	   to	   keep	   score	   of	   the	   rule-­‐based	  
movements	  of	  postulated	  agents,	  and	  it	  is	  no	  accident	  that	  such	  systems	  of	  reasoning	  can	  be	  used	  to	  make	  
counterfactual	  inferences	  concerning	  segregation	  in	  cities.	  It	  is	  just	  the	  case	  that	  that	  there	  is	  no	  substantial	  
and	   general	   philosophical	   explanation	   for	   this	   representational	   success.	   These	   (perfectly	   objective)	  
dependencies	  between	   the	  properties	  of	  external	   inferential	   apparatuses	  and	   their	  possible	  applications,	  
i.e.,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  cognitive	  agents	  can	  perform	  inferential	  tasks	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  external	  aids,	  
are	   empirical	   and	   therefore	   proper	   objects	   of	   study	   for	   cognitive	   science,	   not	   philosophy.	   There	   are	  
genuine	  philosophical	  puzzles,	  but	  the	  problem	  of	  representation	  is	  not	  one	  of	  them.	  
Analyzing	   model-­‐based	   reasoning	   as	   a	   type	   of	   extended	   cognition	   also	   provides	   a	   ready	   answer	   to	   the	  
second	  philosophical	  puzzle	  of	  modeling:	  How	  can	  models	  explain,	  if	  they	  are	  always	  literally	  false	  because	  
of	   their	   untrue	   components	   and	   explanations	   have	   to	   be	   true?	   Explanations	   have	   to	   be	   true	   in	   that	   the	  
cited	   dependency	   must	   match	   the	   ontic	   explanatory	   dependence	   to	   a	   sufficient	   degree	   and	   that	   the	  
derived	  values	  of	  the	  explanandum	  variable	  (the	  fact	  and	  the	  contrastive	  foil)	  must	  be	  “true	  enough.”	  The	  
crucial	  point	  dissolving	  the	  “paradox”	  (cf.	  Reiss	  2012)	  is	  that	  models	  need	  not	  be	  true	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  order	  
for	  them	  to	  yield	  true	  explanations	  –	  if	  they	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  truth	  values	  to	  begin	  with.	  	  
The	  main	  worry	  about	  models	  being	  false	  is	  not	  a	  question	  of	   imperfect	  accuracy	  as	  such,	  but	  of	  outright	  
distortions	   in	   terms	   of	   abstractions	   and	   idealizations.	   Theoretical	   models	   in	   the	   social	   and	   biological	  
sciences	  are	  almost	  invariably	  highly	  unrealistic,	  and	  this	  is	  not	  something	  that	  could	  be	  remedied	  by	  simply	  
making	  more	  accurate	  measurements	  of	  key	  parameter	  values.	  The	  multi-­‐dimensional	  complexity	  of	  these	  
phenomena	   makes	   idealizations	   and	   other	   falsehoods	   necessary	   if	   the	   models	   are	   to	   be	   tractable	   or	  
possess	  any	  degree	  of	  generality.	  The	  realism	  of	  assumptions	  has	  been	  a	  much	  discussed	  methodological	  
issue	  as	  long	  as	  there	  has	  been	  modeling.	  Although	  there	  is	  some	  indeterminacy	  in	  the	  use	  of	  these	  terms,	  
abstraction	   is	  usually	   taken	   to	   refer	   to	   the	  act	  of	  omitting	  some	   feature	  and	  aspect	  of	   the	  phenomenon,	  
and	  idealization	  to	  the	  distortion	  of	  some	  aspect	  to	  a	  suitable	  boundary	  value	  (such	  as	  zero	  or	  infinity).	  	  
Idealizations	   are	   introduced	   into	   models	   in	   order	   to	   virtually/conceptually	   isolate	   the	   causal	   factors	   of	  
interest	   from	   the	   factors	  which	   disturb	   or	  mask	   their	  manifestation	   in	   reality	   (Galilean	   idealizations),	   or	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simply	   in	   order	   to	   render	   the	   model	   tractable	   (tractability	   assumptions).	   Galilean	   idealizations	   are	  
explanatorily	   useful	   because	   they	   isolate	   a	   specific	   causal	   tendency	   from	   the	   clutter	   of	   real	   world	  
phenomena	   (McMullin	   1985).	   They	   are	   necessary	   precisely	   because	   of	   the	   essential	   modal	   element	   of	  
explanatory	  information:	  the	  goal	  of	  explanatory	  models	  is	  not	  to	  provide	  maximally	  accurate	  and	  precise	  
descriptions	   of	   occurrent	   events	   and	   regularities,	   but	   to	   trace	   dependencies	   between	   the	   selected,	   and	  
hopefully	  important,	  factors.	  	  	  
Many	  of	   the	   falsities	   in	  models	  are	   there	  because	  of	   the	   requirements	  of	  mathematical	   tractability	  –	   the	  
specific	  assumption	  could	  not	  be	  included	  in	  the	  mathematical	  model	  in	  a	  more	  realistic	  manner	  in	  a	  way	  
that	  would	  have	  left	  the	  model	  still	  analytically	  solvable	  (Hindriks	  2006).	  Models	  are	  representations	  built	  
using	  formal	  languages,	  and	  this	  also	  means	  that	  assumptions	  have	  to	  often	  be	  implemented	  in	  the	  model	  
in	   a	  more	   specific	   form	   than	  would	   actually	   be	   justifiable	   on	   empirical	   grounds.	   A	  modeled	   explanatory	  
dependence	  is	  robust	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  tractability	  assumptions	  if	  the	  explanatory	  dependence	  is	  not	  
itself	  dependent	  on	  the	  falsities	  in	  the	  model,	  i.e.,	  the	  result	  can	  also	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  same	  empirically	  
interpreted	   (and	   roughly	   correct)	   causal	   assumptions	   and	   alternative	   (but	   similarly	   literally	   false)	  
tractability	  assumptions.	  Many	  modeling	  results,	  and	  even	  whole	  research	  programs,	  do	  not	  quite	  fulfill	  this	  
desideratum.	  Any	  explanations	  posited	  on	  such	  a	  shaky	  basis	  should	  naturally	  be	  treated	  with	  caution.	  
The	  importance	  of	  robustness	  considerations	  underscores	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  assessing	  the	  understanding	  
provided	   by	   theoretical	  modeling,	   the	   proper	   unit	   of	   analysis	   is	   not	   a	   single	  model,	   but	   rather	   a	   whole	  
family	  of	  them	  (Ylikoski	  &	  Aydinonat	  2014).	  Any	  explanation	  provided	  by	  a	  single	  model	  is	  always	  suspect	  in	  
that	   the	   explanatory	   mechanism	   may	   be	   an	   artifact	   of	   false	   tractability	   assumptions.	   Confidence	   in	  
explanations	   derived	   from	   idealized	   models	   should	   only	   come	   about	   through	   a	   process	   of	   robustness	  
analysis:	  deriving	  the	  explanation	  from	  a	  set	  of	  models	  representing	  the	  same	  core	  explanatory	  mechanism	  
but	  using	  different	  alternative	  tractability	  assumptions	  (Kuorikoski,	  Lehtinen,	  and	  Marchionni	  2010;	  Levins	  
1966;	  Weisberg	  2006).	  	  
The	   checkerboard	   model	   is	   very	   abstract	   and	   contains	   strong	   idealizations.	   For	   example,	   it	   assumes	  
homogenous	   preferences,	   ignores	   strong	   discriminatory	   preferences,	   and	   incorporates	   very	   specific	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assumptions	   concerning	   neighborhood	   structure.	   Even	  more	   worryingly,	   it	   completely	   ignores	   all	   of	   the	  
well-­‐known	   causes	   of	   segregation,	   such	   as	   economic	   inequalities	   between	   groups,	   various	   forms	   of	  
institutional	  discrimination	  (redlining,	  racial	  steering	  by	  real-­‐estate	  agents,	  etc.),	  and	  systematic	  differences	  
in	   the	   location	  of	   employment	   or	   channels	   of	   information	   about	   available	   housing	   (Ylikoski	  &	  Aydinonat	  
2014).	   It	   is	  not	  surprising	  that	  these	  “deficiencies”	  have	   led	  many	  to	  dismiss	  the	  explanatory	  value	  of	  the	  
model	  to	  the	  point	  of	  claiming	  that	  it	  “trivializes	  and	  endorses	  racism”.	  This	  accusation	  is	  quite	  unfair,	  since	  
checkerboard	   models	   have	   been	   studied	   for	   over	   forty	   years	   by	   a	   multitude	   of	   scholars	   in	   various	  
disciplines	  and	  thus	  many	  of	  the	  consequent	  findings	  should	  not	  be	  read	  back	  to	  the	  original	  models.	  The	  
segregation	   equilibrium	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   robust	   outcome	   in	   many	   of	   the	   modifications	   to	   the	   model’s	  
structural	  assumptions	   (Aydinonat	  2007;	  Muldoon,	  Smith	  &	  Weisberg	  2012).	  Most	   changes	   in	   the	   size	  of	  
the	  neighborhood,	   individual	  preferences,	  or	  the	  availability	  of	  apartments	  do	  not	  change	  the	  segregated	  
outcome.	  The	  robustness	  of	  the	  model	  speaks	  to	  the	  wide	  relevance	  of	  the	  mechanism:	  it	  can	  work	  under	  a	  
number	   of	   different	   circumstances	   (Schelling	   1978;	   Fossett	   2006).	   However,	   changing	   the	   neighborhood	  
structure,	   the	   probability	   of	   random	   errors,	   or	   the	   type	   of	   preference	   functions	   may	   lead	   to	   non-­‐
segregation	   outcomes	   (e.g.,	   see	   Bruch	   and	  Mare	   2006,	   2009a;	   van	   de	   Rijt,	   Siegel,	   and	  Macy	   2009).	   The	  
speed	  of	  reaching	  the	  equilibrium	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  segregation	  created	  are	  much	   less	  robust	  attributes	  of	  
these	   models.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   recognize	   that	   non-­‐robust	   results	   are	   also	   interesting,	   and	  
knowing	  more	   about	   robust	   and	   non-­‐robust	   cases	   provides	   better	   tools	   for	   answering	   a	   broader	   set	   of	  
what-­‐if	  questions	  and	  thus	   improves	  understanding.	  Robustness	   is	   therefore	  not	  a	  strictly	  necessary,	  and	  
certainly	  not	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  a	  realist	  interpretation	  of	  a	  result	  and	  successful	  representation.6	  	  
What	  about	  utterly	   false	  models	  with	  no	  parts	   that	  could	  be	  said	   to	   represent	  anything?	   	  The	   inferential	  
account	   of	   understanding	   seems	   to	   face	   a	   challenge	   that	   might	   be	   called	   the	   problem	   of	   accidental	  
understanding.	   The	  problem	  arises	   as	   follows:	   Is	   it	   not	  possible	   for	   a	   completely	  wrongheaded	  model	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  More	  qualifications	  and	  caveats	  to	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  robustness	  analysis	  are	  provided	  in	  Kuorikoski,	  Lehtinen	  and	  
Marchionni	  2010	  and	  2012.	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facilitate	  inferences	  that	  just	  happen	  to	  be	  correct	  by	  accident,	  and,	  if	  understanding	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  
ability	  to	  make	  counterfactual	  inferences,	  would	  this	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  completely	  false	  model	  could	  provide	  
true	  understanding?	  But	  surely	  this	  would	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  factivity	  of	  explanation,	  and	  even	  
of	  a	  realist	  view	  of	  science	  in	  general.	  The	  inferentialist	  account	  of	  representation	  provides	  a	  ready	  answer	  
to	   this	   worry.	   When	   representational	   potential	   itself	   is	   understood	   as	   being	   constituted	   by	   (correct)	  
inferential	  affordances,	  it	  becomes	  conceptually	  impossible	  for	  a	  model	  to	  be	  (correctly)	  used	  for	  explaining	  
a	   real	  world	  phenomenon	  and	  at	   the	   same	   time	   fail	   to	   represent	  at	   least	   some	  aspects	   (the	  explanatory	  
dependencies)	   of	   the	   target	   phenomenon. 7 	  As	   with	   understanding,	   the	   inferentialist	   view	   renders	  
representation	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  degree:	  models	  represent	  only	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  modeled	  systems,	  and	  
the	  kinds	  of	   inferences	  made	  using	  the	  model	  determine	  what	  these	  aspects	  are	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
these	   inferences	   are	   correct	  determines	  how	  accurate	   the	   representation	   is.	   Tractability	   assumptions	  do	  
not	  represent	  aspects	  of	  the	  target	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  model	  users	  do	  not	  (aim	  to)	  draw	  direct	  
conclusions	   about	   the	   target	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   them.	   If	   the	   model	   result	   changes	   when	   a	   tractability	  
assumption	  is	  changed,	  then	  the	  result	  is	  judged	  to	  be	  an	  artifact.	  It	  is	  also	  not	  always	  clear	  whether	  a	  given	  
assumption	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  substantive	  or	  as	  a	  tractability	  assumption,	  and	  this	  status	  may	  change	  over	  
time.	   The	   line	   between	   substantial	   and	   tractability	   assumptions,	   between	   the	   representational	   and	  non-­‐
representational	  parts,	   is	  not	   fixed	  and	   is	  not	  an	   intrinsic	  property	  of	   the	  model,	  but	  rather	  a	   function	  of	  
how	  the	  model	  is	  used	  in	  inference.	  
Let	   us	   summarize	   how	   the	   apparent	   air	   of	   paradox	   related	   to	  model-­‐based	   explanation	   vanishes	   in	   our	  
account.	  First,	  there	  is	  an	  observation:	  The	  purpose	  of	  abstract	  theoretical	  models	  is	  not	  to	  reproduce	  some	  
empirical	  phenomenon	  in	  all	  its	  rich	  detail;	  rather,	  it	  is	  to	  capture	  a	  small	  set	  of	  explanatory	  dependencies	  
that	   are	   assumed	   to	  be	   central.	   Second,	   all	   of	   the	  model’s	   assumptions	   are	  not	   equal.	   For	   example,	   the	  
truth	  of	  the	  model’s	  tractability	  assumptions	  is	  treated	  differently	  from	  the	  assumptions	  that	  are	  related	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  There	  remains	  the	  logical	  possibility	  that	  a	  model	  originally	  not	  intended	  to	  represent	  a	  specific	  system	  or	  one	  built	  
using	  unsound	  epistemic	  principles	  could	  reliably	  facilitate	  correct	  counterfactual	  inferences	  by	  purely	  accident.	  We	  
do	  not	  know	  of	  any	  cases	  of	  such	  accidental	  representational	  success,	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the	  explanatory	  dependence	  the	  model	  is	  trying	  to	  capture.	  The	  point	  of	  robustness	  analysis	  is	  to	  show	  that	  
tractability	  (and	  other	  non-­‐essential)	  assumptions	  make	  no	  difference	  to	  the	  explanatory	  dependence.	  This	  
does	  not	  obviate	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  model	  should	  get	  the	  target	  explanatory	  dependence	  right.	  Thus	  
explanation	  remains	  factive.	  Finally,	  when	  an	  abstract	  theoretical	  model	  is	  used	  to	  explain	  some	  concrete	  
empirical	   phenomenon,	   the	   claim	   is	   not	   that	   the	   model	   provides	   a	   full	   or	   complete	   explanation	   of	   a	  
puzzling	  fact.	  Rather,	  the	  suggestion	  is	  much	  more	  modest:	  the	  model	  captures	  an	  important,	  maybe	  even	  
crucial,	  element	  of	  the	  phenomenon’s	  explanation.	  It	  is	  a	  bet	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  mechanism	  captured	  by	  
the	  model	   plays	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   full	   explanatory	   story.	   Naturally,	   this	   bet	   can	   be	  misplaced	   as	   the	  
mechanism	  may	  not	  have	  the	  suggested	  role.	   In	  such	  cases	  the	  model	  provides	  at	  most	  a	  part	  of	  a	  how-­‐
possibly	   explanation	   (Ylikoski	   &	   Aydinonat	   2014),	   not	   the	   actual	   explanation	   of	   the	   phenomenon.	   Thus,	  
when	  understood	  correctly,	  theoretical	  models	  provide	  no	  special	  explanatory	  challenges	  or	  paradoxes	  for	  
the	  theory	  of	  explanation.	  
	  
6.	  Evaluating	  explanatory	  models	  
We	  have	  argued	  above	  that	  our	  inferential	  view	  can	  answer	  the	  most	  vexing	  philosophical	  problems	  related	  
to	  model	   based	   explanation.	   If	   possible,	   a	   theory	   of	   explanation	   and	   understanding	   should	   not	   only	   tell	  
when	  and	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  something	  is	  or	  is	  not	  an	  explanation,	  but	  also	  provide	  tools	  to	  assess	  when	  one	  
explanation	  is	  better	  than	  another.	  We	  now	  show	  how	  the	  view	  can	  be	  used	  to	  comparatively	  evaluate	  the	  
explanatory	   qualities	   of	   models.	   The	   explanatory	   potential	   of	   a	   particular	   inferential	   apparatus	   can	   be	  
evaluated	  along	  the	  lines	  laid	  out	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  paper:	  the	  more	  (and	  the	  more	  interesting)	  what-­‐
if	   questions	   the	  model	   helps	   the	  model	   user	   to	   answer,	   the	  more	   understanding	   it	   provides.	   This	   is	   an	  
immediate	  consequence	  of	  our	   inferentialist	  view,	  since	  understanding	   is	  constituted	  by	   these	   inferential	  
abilities.	  This	   increase	  in	  explanatory	   inferential	  ability	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  along	  different	  dimensions	  of	  
explanatory	   power:	   non-­‐sensitivity,	   precision,	   factual	   accuracy,	   degree	   of	   integration,	   and	   cognitive	  
salience	  (for	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  treatment,	  see	  Ylikoski	  and	  Kuorikoski	  2010).	  The	  first	  four	  dimensions	  
mainly	  concern	  the	  number	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  inferences	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  model,	  whereas	  the	  last	  one	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is	  about	  the	  ease	  and	  reliability	  of	  drawing	  these	  inferences.	  The	  dimensions	  are	  partly	   independent,	  and	  
there	  are	  systematic	  (though	  non-­‐strict)	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  them.	  The	  trade-­‐offs	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  model-­‐based	  explanations.	  Here	  we	  discuss	  only	  trade-­‐offs	  among	  explanatory	  virtues	  and	  do	  not	  
take	  a	  stand	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  much	  discussed	  issue	  of	  strict	  trade-­‐offs	  among	  general	  model	  desiderata	  
inspired	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Richard	  Levins	  (see,	  e.g.	  Matthewson	  and	  Weisberg	  2009).	  
Formal	   models	   are	   more	   exact	   than	   purely	   verbal	   theorizing	   in	   that	   the	   logical	   and	   mathematical	  
relationships	  between	  concepts	  and	  variables	  are	  explicitly	  defined,	  thus	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  derive	  more	  
precise	  implications	  from	  the	  assumptions.	  However,	  these	  same	  models	  might	  not	  fare	  well	  with	  respect	  
to	  facilitating	  detailed	  inferences	  about	  the	  explanandum	  phenomenon.	  Thus	  they	  are	  often	  deficient	  in	  the	  
dimension	  of	  explanatory	  power	  that	  we	  call	  precision.	  	  The	  key	  here	  is	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  exactness	  of	  
formal	  and	  mathematical	  derivations	   is	  not	  the	  same	  property	  as	  the	  dimension	  of	  explanatory	  goodness	  
that	   we	   have	   labeled	   precision.	   Theoretical	   models	   can	   rarely	   credibly	   aim	   at	   providing	   quantitative	  
estimates	   about	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  modeled	   factors.	   For	   example,	   the	   segregation	  models	   can	   only	  
provide	  grounds	  for	  qualitative	  reasoning	  that	  some	  factors	  are	  relevant	  to,	  say,	  the	  speed	  or	  probability	  of	  
spontaneous	  segregation,	  but	  not	  to	  what	  degree.	   In	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  model	   is	   formally	  exact,	   it	   is	  
not	   very	   precise	   in	   being	   able	   to	   account	   for	   fine	   grained	   contrasts	   in	   the	   empirical	   explanandum	  
phenomenon.	  The	  model	  says	  that	  segregation	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  circumstances,	  but	  the	  
more	   precise	   characteristics	   of	   the	   produced	   segregation	   will	   remain	   opaque.	   This	   is	   a	   quite	   general	  
property	   of	   abstract	   theoretical	   models.	   Outside	   physics,	   with	   its	   stable,	   universal,	   and	   precise	   physical	  
constants,	  any	  quantitative	  inferences	  must	  be	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  case-­‐specific	  quantitative	  data	  and	  this	  
is	  not	  possible	  with	  models	  that	  ignore	  many	  details	  of	  the	  particular	  setting	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  something	  
more	  general	  about	  the	  mechanism	  of	  interest.	  
This	   is	   the	   reason	   why	   theoretical	   models,	   being	   highly	   abstract,	   would	   usually	   not	   be	   considered	   very	  
interesting	  if	  they	  were	  highly	  sensitive	  to	  specific	  initial	  conditions	  –	  i.e.,	  highly	  factually	  accurate.	  A	  model	  
must	  be	  robust	  with	  respect	  to	  (at	  least	  some)	  of	  the	  idealizations	  that	  are	  known	  to	  be	  always	  false,	  but	  it	  
can	   also	   be	   robust	   with	   respect	   to	   assumptions	   that	   can	   be	   true	   or	   false,	   depending	   on	   the	   empirical	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application.	  In	  practice,	  these	  kinds	  of	  robustness	  are	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  distinguish	  between.	  Furthermore,	  
as	   stated	   above,	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   assumptions	   might	   change:	   some	   assumptions	   that	   were	  
originally	   treated	   as	   pure	   tractability	   assumptions	  may	   later	   be	   interpreted	   as	   empirical	   assumptions,	   or	  
vice	  versa.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  more	  robust	  the	  result,	  the	  better	  the	  explanations	  derived	  from	  the	  model.	  
Note	  that	  robustness	   is	   important	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	   it	   is	  needed	  to	   justify	  the	  extrapolation	  from	  an	  
abstract	  model	   to	   a	   specific	   application	   –	   if	   the	   result	   is	   not	   robust	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   expect	   that	   it	  
would	   hold	   in	   situations	   where	   idealizations	   and	   omissions	   of	   the	  model	   do	   not	   apply.	   This	   is	   a	   purely	  
epistemic	   requirement	   related	   to	   how	   reliably	   the	   model	   result	   can	   be	   used	   in	   explaining	   real	   world	  
phenomena,	   not	   an	   explanatory	   virtue	   per	   se.	   Second,	   robustness	   is	   also	   related	   to	   non-­‐sensitivity	   as	   a	  
dimension	  of	  explanatory	  goodness:	  given	  that	  the	  explanation	  is	  true,	  the	  more	  sensitive	  the	  explanatory	  
dependence	  is	  to	  changes	  in	  background	  factors,	  the	  less	  powerful	  explanations	  it	  provides.	  In	  either	  case	  
there	   is	   a	   trade-­‐off:	   robustness	   can	   usually	   only	   be	   gained	   by	   sacrificing	   precision	   and	   factual	   accuracy	  
(Kuorikoski,	  Lehtinen	  &	  Marchionni	  2010).	  
Some	  models	  are	  built	  anew	  from	  the	  ground	  up	  while	  others	  belong	  to	  a	  research	  program	  using	  a	  family	  
of	  established	  templates.	  If	  the	  model	  is	  built	  from	  scratch,	  the	  modeler,	  provided	  she	  is	  clever	  enough,	  can	  
model	   precisely	   those	   and	   only	   those	   factors	   she	   hypothesizes	   to	   be	   important.	   The	   downside	   is	   that	  
relating	  such	  stand-­‐alone	  models,	  especially	  theoretical	  ones,	  to	  other	  bodies	  of	  model-­‐based	  knowledge	  is	  
often	  difficult.	  If	  there	  is	  only	  one	  isolated	  model,	  it	  is	  next	  to	  impossible	  to	  evaluate	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
factors	  modeled	  and	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  inferences	  given	  the	  idealizations	  implemented	  in	  the	  model.	  This	  
is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  models	  differ	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  integration.	  If	  a	  model	  is	  integrated	  within	  a	  program	  of	  
similar	  models,	  then	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  explanatory	  inferences	  becomes	  easier	  to	  evaluate.	  The	  extended	  
model	   family	  can	  also	  provide	  additional	   “theorems”	  and	  suggestions	  about	  how	  to	  expand	   the	   range	  of	  
what-­‐if	   inferences	   derivable	   using	   the	   model.	   The	   continuing	   research	   on	   Schelling	   type	   models	   has	  
revealed	   that	   although	   segregation	   is	   a	   robust	   result	   under	   many	   structural	   assumptions,	   changes	   in	  
neighborhood	  structure,	  the	  probability	  of	  random	  errors,	  or	  the	  type	  of	  preference	  functions	  may	  lead	  to	  
non-­‐segregation	   outcomes	   –	   and	   some	   of	   these	   dependencies	   may	   have	   a	   realistic	   interpretation	   (e.g.,	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Bruch	  and	  Mare	  2006;	  2009).	  Thus	  an	   integrated	   family	  of	  models	  contributes	   to	  explanatory	  knowledge	  
more	  than	  individual	  models	  considered	  separately.	  	  
These	   considerations	   make	   it	   understandable	   why	   scientists	   do	   not	   feel	   that	   developing	   hyper-­‐realistic	  
models	  is	  a	  promising	  way	  to	  gain	  explanatory	  insight	  into	  complex	  systems.	  While	  replacing	  idealizations	  
with	  empirically	  established	  values	  and	  adding	  omitted	  factors	  might	  make	  the	  model	  a	  more	  realistic	  and	  
truthful	   representation	  of	   the	  observable	  attributes	  of	  a	   target	   system,	   such	  a	  model	  might	  not	   improve	  
explanatory	  understanding.	  Apart	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  scientists	  are	  building	  the	  model	  partly	  because	  they	  
do	   not	   know	   which	   omitted	   factors	   are	   relevant,	   this	   complex	   model	   would	   also	   be	   deficient	   in	   the	  
understanding	   it	   provides.	   There	   are	   two	  major	   reasons	   for	   this.	   First,	   a	   complex	  model	  would	   be	  more	  
difficult	  to	  handle,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  scientists’	  ability	  to	  perform	  what-­‐if	  inferences	  of	  interest	  might	  be	  
seriously	   reduced.	   Understanding	   with	   the	   model	   usually	   remains	   shallow	   and	   unreliable	   if	   it	   is	   not	  
accompanied	   with	   a	   proper	   understanding	   of	   the	   model.	   Second,	   the	   aim	   of	   explanatory	   models	   is	   to	  
capture	  the	  key	  dependencies	  on	  which	  the	  behavior	  of	   the	  system	  depends,	  but	  a	  hyper-­‐realistic	  model	  
that	  manages	  to	  “save	  the	  observable	  phenomenon”	  might	  just	  obscure	  them.	  Thus	  one	  would	  not	  achieve	  
a	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  underlying	  causal	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  also	  be	  applicable	  to	  other	  cases.	  
This	   is	   important	   because	   the	   aim	   of	   an	   explanatory	   model	   is	   to	   represent	   explanatory	   dependencies	  
relevant	  to	  the	  phenomenon,	  and	  not	  simply	  represent	  one	  particular	   instance	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  Thus	  
one	  must	  be	  selective,	  and	  some	  idealizations	  and	  omissions	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  virtuous	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  
of	  representing	  explanatory	  relations.	  
Models	  differ	  in	  their	  ease	  of	  use,	  in	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  interface	  between	  the	  model	  and	  the	  model	  user.	  
This	  cognitive	  salience	  of	  models	  is	  of	  direct	  epistemic	  relevance,	  since	  it	  affects	  the	  number	  and	  reliability	  
of	  inferences	  available	  to	  the	  extended	  cognitive	  system.	  Cognitive	  salience	  can	  be	  based	  on	  anything	  from	  
a	  good	  user	  interface	  in	  a	  simulation	  package	  to	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  representing	  a	  mathematical	  structure	  
that	   makes	   the	   identification	   of	   the	   necessary	   empirical	   background	   assumptions	   as	   transparent	   as	  
possible.	  Naturally,	  the	  ease	  of	  use	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  background	  skills	  of	  the	  scientist:	  her	  judgment	  of	  
the	   relative	   explanatory	   merits	   of	   a	   specific	   model	   may	   be	   based	   on	   her	   familiarity	   with	   the	   modeling	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framework	  –	  she	  is	  able	  to	  think	  with	  it	  –	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  general	  deficiencies	  in	  competing	  models.	  It	  
might	  be	  that	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  other	  scientists,	  the	  competing	  models	  may	  provide	  comparable	  explanatory	  
insight.	  	  
Sometimes	   the	   ease	   of	   use	   increases	   the	   chances	   of	   the	   illusion	   of	   depth	   of	   understanding	   by	   making	  
“toying	  with	   the	  model”	   too	  easy	   in	  such	  a	  way	  which	  crowds	  out	   thinking	  about	   the	  crucial	  background	  
assumptions	  needed	   to	   reliably	   infer	  with	   the	  model	   to	  a	   real	  world	  phenomenon.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  
off-­‐the-­‐shelf	   micro-­‐simulation	   packages	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   are	   a	   good	   example	   of	   this.	   In	   contrast,	  
programming	   the	  simulation	   from	  the	  ground	  up	  necessitates	   thinking	  about	  what	  exactly	   the	   important	  
assumptions	  are,	  what	  kind	  of	  empirical	  background	  assumptions	  have	  to	  be	  made	  in	  order	  for	  the	  model	  
to	   be	   interpretable,	   and	   what	   kind	   of	   tractability	   assumptions	   have	   to	   go	   into	   the	   model	   to	   make	   it	  
computable.	  
The	  cognitive	  salience	  and	  degree	  of	  integration	  also	  (partially)	  account	  for	  the	  widely	  held	  view	  that	  using	  
a	  single	  unifying	  model	  template	  to	  explain	  many	  phenomena	  is	  explanatorily	  virtuous.	  If	  the	  same	  model	  
template	  can	  be	  used	   in	  a	  multitude	  of	   situations	   to	  make	  novel	   inferences	  about	  different	  phenomena,	  
then	   obviously	   the	  model	   user	   is	   spared	   from	   the	  work	   of	   learning	   to	   use	   new	   inferential	   aids.	   Using	   a	  
similar	  model	  also	  facilitates	  linking	  related	  results	  and	  inferences	  in	  the	  analogous	  domains	  of	  application,	  
thus	   possibly	   enabling	   new	   counterfactual	   inferences	   and	   increasing	   the	   degree	   of	   integration.	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  does	  not	   imply	  that	  unification	  as	  such	   is	  constitutive	  of	  explanatory	  understanding,	  as	  
this	  easy	  applicability	  of	   the	  model	  might	  be	  achieved	  by	  a	  serious	  simplification	  or	  misrepresentation	  of	  
the	   original	   explanandum	   phenomenon.	   In	   such	   cases,	   increased	   “unification”	   does	   not	   increase	  
understanding	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  correct	  what-­‐if	   inferences	  about	  the	  phenomenon.	  This	  
suggests	   that	   philosophical	   theories	   that	   attempt	   to	   reconstruct	   explanatory	   understanding	   in	   terms	   of	  
unification	  might	   be	   based	   on	   an	   attribution	   error.	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   such	  
unification	  may	  come	  at	  a	  great	  cost	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  other	  dimensions	  of	  explanatory	  goodness,	  and	  
can	  easily	   lead	  to	   illusory	  understanding.	  For	  example,	  after	  becoming	  proficient	   in	  using	  the	  segregation	  
simulations,	  our	  urban	  sociologist	  might	  begin	  to	  see	  segregation	  processes	  everywhere.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  bad	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thing	   in	   itself,	   since	   segregation	   processes	   in	   the	   abstract	   sense	   are	   everywhere.	   However,	   the	   habit	   of	  
explaining	   diverse	   phenomena	   with	   the	   same	   segregation	   model	   becomes	   problematic	   when	   a	   specific	  
mechanism	   for	   segregation	   is	   automatically	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   best	   or	   even	   the	   only	   explanation	   for	  
segregation	  outcomes	  just	  because	  that	  would	  be	  “unifying”	  or	  “elegant.”	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  
So	  how	  do	  unrealistic	  surrogate	  systems	  explain	  real	  phenomena?	  Above	  we	  have	  laid	  out	  an	  inferentialist	  
answer	  to	  this	  question.	  A	  model	  can	  be	  said	  to	  explain	  a	  contrastive	  explanandum	  if	  it	  can	  be	  reliably	  used	  
as	   an	   inferential	   aid	   in	   correctly	   reasoning	   that	   if	   the	   explanans	   variable	   had	   been	   different,	   the	  
explanandum	  would	  have	  been	  different	  as	  well.	  Such	  an	  inferential	  apparatus	  is	  explanatorily	  valuable	  if	  it	  
increases	   the	   range	   of	   such	   explanatory	   inferences,	   makes	   the	   inferences	   more	   reliable	   or	   helps	   to	  
explicate	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  such	  inferences	  can	  be	  made.	  The	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  model,	  
and	   consequently	   the	   amount	   and	   type	   of	   understanding	   it	   can	   provide,	   amounts	   to	   the	   number	   and	  
importance	  of	  these	  inferences	  it	  enables.	  This	  explanatory	  power	  can	  be	  further	  analyzed	  according	  to	  our	  
schema	  of	  the	  dimensions	  of	  explanatory	  power.	  Our	  inferentialist	  framework	  also	  captures	  the	  epistemic	  
role	  of	  understanding	  the	  model:	  the	  range	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  explanatory	  inferences	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  
representational	   artifact	   depends	   on	   the	   interface	   between	   the	   user	   and	   the	  model.	   Understanding	   the	  
model	   and	   understanding	   with	   the	   model	   should	   be	   kept	   separate,	   since	   the	   intuitive	   sense	   of	  
understanding	  triggered	  by	  understanding	  the	  model	  may	  be	  confused	  with	  an	  increased	  understanding	  of	  
the	  modeled	  phenomena.	  
The	  “representational	  power”	  of	  the	  model	  is	  also	  constituted	  by	  its	  inferential	  potential,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  
around.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  representation	  relation	  is	  somehow	  arbitrary	  or	  depends	  on	  the	  whim	  of	  
the	  model	  user	  –	  it	   is	  just	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  philosophically	  substantial	  to	  say	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
agents	  with	  particular	  cognitive	  abilities	  can	  use	  external	  tools	  to	  extend	  their	  inferential	  and	  manipulative	  
capabilities	   concerning	   their	   surroundings	   as	   well	   as	   themselves.	   Conceptualizing	   modeling	   in	   terms	   of	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extended	  cognition	  and	   inferential	  activity	  helps	   to	  keep	   intuitions	  about	   the	  analogy	  between	  modeling	  
and	  experimentation	  in	  check.	  The	  epistemic	  (inductive)	  gap	  is	  not	  really	  between	  the	  manipulated	  artificial	  
world	   of	   the	   model	   and	   the	   real	   world,	   but	   between	   the	   set	   of	   modeling	   assumptions,	   which	   always	  
includes	   literally	  untrue	  and	  even	  empirically	  uninterpretable	  members,	  and	   the	  conclusions.	  Models	  are	  
arguments,	  not	  experiments.	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